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THE ENFORCEMENT OF COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS
It is a tribute to Canadian employers and trade unions that there 
are only a handful of reported Canadian cases dealing in any way with 
problems of enforcement of collective agreements. Apparently even the 
least congenial of unions and employers regard it their duty to comply 
with the terms of a collective agreement, at least after bona fide disputes 
as to the meaning of the agreement have been settled by arbitration or 
otherwise.
Although the decision as to what action to take to enforce a collect­
ive agreement may not frequently arise in practice, it is an ever present 
problem and can become important at any time if one's opponent is 
particularly recalcitrant. While not intended to be an exhaustive treat­
ment of the subject, it is hoped this paper may help to point the way for 
the busy practitioner faced with an enforcement problem.
LEG A L STATUS OF CO LLECTIVE AGREEM ENTS
Consideration of the legal status of a collective agreement, as 
will be seen, has become academic as a result of recent legislative devel­
opments (except in Ontario) but a brief statement is not out of order 
as a prelude to the understanding of the main problem.
At Common Law, in Canada at least, a collective agreement was 
regarded as merely a statement of working conditions not forming part 
of the individual’s contract of employment.1 The employee, unless he 
actually was a signatory to a collective agreement, was thus left with no 
remedy against an employer who breacned the agreement2 unless he 
could establish that the union entered into the agreement as his duly 
authorized agent.3 The only effective remedy for a breach of a collective 
agreement was stated by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council to 
be economic action in the form of a strike by the union or a lock-out 
by the employer.4
The unenforceability of collective agreements, as between employer 
and employee, did not prohibit actions between the employer and the 
union itself if they were actually parties to the contract. Tne lack of legal 
validity vis-a-vis an employee resulted solelv from the fact that the em­
ployee was not a party to the agreement. The only problem in an em­
ployer - union case was the question whether the union had status to 
sue and be sued.
(1) Y oun ( v C.N.R. (1931) 1 D .L.R. 645 (P .C .); Arts v Toronto, Hamilton & B u ffa lo  R.
Co. [1933) 1 D .L.R . 634 (O nt.); W rifht et a l v C alvary H erald 11938] 1 D .L.R . I l l  
(A lta. A .D .).
(2) Z lfe r  v Sh iffer & H illman Co. Ltd. [1933] 2 D .L.R . 691 (Ont. C .A .).
(3) Ibid, per Logie, J . .  tr ia l judge , a t p. 695.
(4) Lord  R ussell of K illow en in Y o u n t v C.N.R. [1931] 1 D .L.R . 645 a t p. 663.
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ENFORCEM ENT B Y  ECONOMIC ACTION
The case in which the Judicial Committee decreed that economic 
action was the sole means of enforcing a collective agreement was decid­
ed before the advent of statutory provisions, which are now common to 
most labour relations legislation, that no strike or lock-out can be declar­
ed during the currency of a collective agreement.5 With the advent of 
this legislation, the remedy of enforcing a collective agreement by econ­
omic action disappeared. Economic action can now De used only as a 
means of forcing the opposite party to enter into a collective agreement 
in favourable terms.
ENFORCEM ENT B Y ARBITRATIO N OR COURT ACTION? ,
Most labour relations legislation now requires that all collective 
agreements contain a provision for final settlement of disputes and 
that parties to the agreement must comply with that provision and give 
cffcct thereto.
In New Brunswick, section 18 of the Labour Relations Act6 reads:
18. (1) Every collective agreem ent entered into a fte r  the com m encem ent of 
this Act shall contain a provision for final settlem ent, w ithout sto ppage of 
work, by arb itration  or otherw ise, of a ll differences between the parties to or 
persons bound by the agreem ent or on whose beh alf it was entered into, co n ­
cern in g its m eanin g or violation .
(2) W here a collective agreem ent, w hether entered into before or a fter  the 
com m encem ent of this Act, docs not contain  a provision  as requ ired  by this 
section, the Board sh all, upon ap p lica tio n  o f e ith er party  to the agreem ent, 
by order p re sa  ibe a provision for such purpose an d  a  provision so prescribed 
shall be deem ed to be a term o f the collective agreem ent an d  b in d in g  on the 
p arties to an d  all persons bound by the agreem ent an d  a ll persons on whose 
l)ehalf the agreem ent was entered into.
(3) Every party  to an d  every person bound by the agreem ent and every p e r­
son on whose beh alf the agreem ent was entered into, shall com ply with the 
provision  for fin al settlem ent contained  in the agreem ent an d  give effect 
thereto.
The difficulties existing at Common Law as to whether a collective 
agreement is binding upon the individual employee have been overcome 
by legislation, such as section 17 of the New Brunswick Act, which prov­
ides that a collective agreement is, subject to and for the purpose of the 
Act, binding upon the union and all the employees in the unit as well 
as the employer.7 This section is sufficient to give efficacy to the prov­
isions of section 18.
<5t New B run sw ick  Lab ou r R elation s A ct, R .S .N .B . 1952, c. 124, s. 21; Nova Scotia  T rade  
Union A ct, R .S .N .S . 1954, c. 295, s. 22. The P rince E dw ard  Islan d  T rade  Union A ct 
proh ibits strikes and lock-outs until d ispu tes are  arb itra ted , but does not specifically  
forb id  such  action during the curency of an agreem en t; see R .S .P .E .I. 1951, c. 184, 
s. 13(1). The text of this paper, in general, refers to the New B run sw ick  A ct; re fer­
ences w ill a lso  be m ade in the footnotes to the N ova Scotia  and Prince E dw ard  Islan d  
legislation .
(6) R .S .N .B . 1952, c. 124; s. 19, R .S .N .S . 1954, c. 295 is id en tical; there Is no sim ilar p ro v ­
ision in the P .E .I. Act.
(71 R .S .N .B . 1952, c. 124; s. 18(1), R .S .N .S . 1954, c. 295 Is iden tical; there is no •im ilar  
provision  in P .E .I.
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The words of section 18 appear to be sufficiently directive that any 
person, either employer, employee or union, seeking to enforce the terms 
of a collective agreement must do so through the means for final settle­
ment provided in the agreement or prescribed by the Labour Relations 
Board. In a recent Ontario case this result is strongly indicated.8 An em­
ployer who was dissatisfied with the finding of an arbitration board 
applied to the court by way of certiorari to quash the award on the 
ground that the arbitration board had exceeded its jurisdiction, but cer­
tiorari could only lie if the board was a “ statutory tribunal.” It was held 
that the provisions of the Labour Relations Act compelling the parties 
to arbitrate their dispute was sufficient statutory authority to render 
the board, in effect, a statutory tribunal and that certiorari was applica­
ble. The effect of this decision, for present purposes, is that section 18 
is an absolute statutory' direction which the parties must obey. The same 
compulsion was indicated recently bv the Supreme Court of British Col­
umbia,9 where it was stated that if the employees concerned had any dis­
pute with their employer, it was their duty to resolve it in accordance 
with the arbitration clause of the collective argeement.
Section 18 calls for a provision for “ final settlement of all differ­
ences between the parties. . .  .concerning its meaning or violation.” It is 
difficult to see what dispute could arise respecting a collective agreement 
that would not come within these words. They are broad enough to in­
clude any type of dispute that could otherwise be raised in the form of 
a legal action if the difficulties mentioned above respecting the bring­
ing of action did not exist.
It is a rule of statutory construction applicable in considering whe­
ther a statutory procedure abolishes previously existing actions to ask:
Is the substituted procedure a complete one, and have the parties the 
same rights to be neard as they formerly possessed?.10 Section 18 not 
only gives the parties the same rights as tney had before, but appears to 
enlarge them in that the previously existing common law disabil­
ities nave been taken away. Section 18 is phrased in clear and unmistake- 
able terms.
It seems to follow that any possibility of court action to enforce a 
collective agreement either between the actual signatories to the agree­
ment (the union and the employer) or by or against any employee has 
been taken away bv statute and that enforcement must be accomplished 
through the procedure established pursuant to the statute.11
(8) Re Arbitration of International Union of Mine. Metal and Sm elter Worker*, re Inter­
national N ickel (19561 1 CCH Canadian  L ab our Law  R eporter (hereinafter cited as 
C .L .L .R .) 15,063 (Ont. C .A .).
(9) Dawson, Wade A Co. Ltd. et al v Tunnel and Rockworkers Union of Canada et al
11956 ) 5 D .L.R . (2nd) 663.
(10) H als (2nd), Vol. 31, p. 503.
(11) In O ntario s. 3(3) of The R ights of Lab ou r Act, R .S.O . 1950, c. 341, provides: "A  co l­
lective b argain in g  agreem en t sh all not be the su b jec t of any action in any court u n ­
less It m ay be the su b jec t of such action irrespective of any of the provisions of th is 
act or of The L ab ou r R elation s A ct” , so that w hatever actions existed  a t Comm on 
L aw  appear to still ex ist In that province. In a paper presented  a t the C anadian  B ar 
A ssociation  ann ual m eeting in 1956, P rof. J .  M cL. H endry exp ressed  the view  th at 
collective agreem en ts could still be enforced by court action.
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A recent decision of Clyne, J. in the British Columbia Supreme 
Court,12 however, casts doubt on the validity of this conclusion. A com­
pany became involved in a jurisdictional dispute between the union 
with which it had a collective agreement and another union which con­
tended certain work should be done by its members rather than those 
of the first union. The company ordered the first union and its men to 
do the work as it was included in the work defined in the collective agree­
ment. The union refused and also declined to follow the grievance pro­
cedure of the agreement. The company brought an action against its 
own union for an injunction and a declaration to compel the union and 
its members to do the work covered in the agreement, and against the 
second union to restrain it from inducing a breach of contract by the 
first union. Notwithstanding that the statute contained provisions iden­
tical with subsections (1) and (2) of section 18, the court held the first 
union had breached the collective agreement and gave judgment for the 
company. The decision makes no reference to these statutory provisions. 
The only distinguishing feature of this case is that the statute did not 
contain the provisions of subsection (3) of section 18 which direct the 
parties to abide by the result of an arbitration clause. On the other hand 
the statute did contain a section, as does the Nova Scotia Act, requiring 
all parties concerned to do everything they are required to do bv the 
provisions of the collective agreement.
With respect, it is difficult to see why the parties to this case should 
not have been compelled to arbitrate their difference in accordance with 
the clear language of the statute. It is submitted that, inasmuch as the 
decision does not refer to the arbitration sections of the statute, this 
case does not weaken the foregoing thesis that the clear language of the 
statute must be obeyed and that the jurisdiction of the courts is ousted.
The last mentioned case brings up a subsidiary problem: what means 
of enforcement can be adopted if the alleged offender fails to appoint 
an arbitrator as required bv the arbitration clause? The answer seems to 
be that the arbitration clause should spell out a method for completing 
the arbitration in the event of a refusal to appoint and that, if the clause 
does not so provide, the complaining party would have a right to apply 
under the Arbitration Act to complete the arbitration in the way in 
which that Act provides.
Section 1& however, does not affect the special terms of any individ­
ual contract of employment that may exist separate from a collcctive 
agreement. For example, a man might be employed for a fixed term of 
one year in a classification covered t>y a collective agreement, the terms 
of his employment to be as set out in the agreement. Assuming the col­
lective agreement contains no terms restricting the employer’s right to 
discharge employees, the employee would have an action against tne em­
ployer for damages for wrongful dismissal prior to the end of the one 
year period. This would not dc a difference concerning the meaning or
(12) G. H. W heaton I.td. v I.oral 1598, U nited Brotherhood of Carpenters St Joiners of 
Am erica et al 11957] 6 D .L .R . <2ndl 500.
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violation of the collectivc agreement but a dispute arising out of the 
separate agreement of service. There is nothing in the Act precluding 
action in tnc courts on this type of claim.
ENFORCEM ENT OF ARBITRATIO N  AW ARD
Once having taken the dispute to an arbitration board and the 
board ha\ing rendered its final award, the next hurdle is the problem 
of how to enforce the award should the losing party fail to voluntarily 
comply with it.
There seems to be two avenues open, first, bv signing judgment under 
the Arbitration Act; secondlv, bv a prosecution for a breach of the Lab­
our Relations Act.
1. Enforcement under Arbitration Act
Scction 3 of the New Brunswick Arbitration Act13 states that the 
Act applies to every arbitration under any Act as if the arbitration were 
pursuant to a submission. In view of the Ontario decision that a labour 
arbitration board is, by virtue of the Labour Relations Act, a statutory 
tribunal for purposes of certiorari, it seems apparent that it must be an 
arbitration “ uncler” an Act within the meaning of section 3 of the Arbi­
tration Act. The effect is the same as if the Labour Relations Act itself 
contained the required arbitration submission applicable to all collective 
agreements.
It seems also clear that a labour arbitration comes within the Arbi­
tration Act apart from the effect of the Labour Relations Act. The 
relevant sections of the Arbitration Act refer to a “ submission” , and a 
submission is defined as “ a written agreement to submit present or 
future differences to arbitration, whether an arbitrator is named therein 
or not." In the definition of “ submission” there is no reference to an 
arbitration agreement existing by virtue of an Act of the Legislature and 
it is therefore indicated that the Arbitration Act applies to all arbitrat­
ion submissions regardless of their source.14
The enforcement section of the Arbitration Act is section 18 which 
provides:
An aw ard on a subm ission  m ay, by leave o f the C ourt, be entered  as a ju d g ­
m ent o f the C ourt and m ay. with taxed  costs, be enforced in the sam e 
m anner as a ju d gm en t or order to the sam e e ffe ct.is
(13) R .S .N .B . 1952, c. 9. The A rb itrator» A ct of N ova Scotia , R .S .N .S . 1954, c. 13 does not 
contain  sim ilar  provisions and, therefore, th is paragrap h  does not app ly  to that 
province. S. 3. R .S .P .E .I. 1951, c. 12 Is iden tical to s. 3 o f the N .B. A ct; see a lso  s 19 
of the P .E .I. T rad e  Union A ct a s  enacted  by s. 1 of c. 3 of the S ta tu te s  of P .E .I. 
1953 (2nd S ess .) .
(14) R .S .N .B . 1952. c. 9, s. 1 (g ) ; R .S .N .S . 1954, c. 13. s. 1(d) and  R .S .P .E .I 1951, c. 12. s 1 are  
sim ilar in term s.
(15) R .S .N .B . 1952, c. 9; R .S .N .S . 1954 c. 13. s. 14 and R .S .P .E .I. 1951, c. 12. s . 13 are  su b s­
tan tia lly  to the sam e .effect.
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It is therefore open to a party seeking to enforce an award of a labour 
arbitration boara to have the award entered as a judgment of the court. 
This makes it possible to enforce the award through anv of the ordinary 
means of enforcing court judgments—executions, examinations proceed­
ings, etc. It also means that failure to abide by the directions of an award 
so entered will be a contempt of court, punishable by imprisonment or 
sequestration.
The peculiar problems of enforcing a judgment against a union de­
sc ae  special treatment. Tne Common Law difficulties arising from the 
status of unions as mere unincorporated associations have, in the past, 
created enforcement problems. These obstacles are dealt with in the 
judgment of Ritchie. J., in the recent Saint John I.L.A. dispute,16 the 
decision of the Manitoba Court of Appeal in the famous Tunnev  case,17 
(both of which judgments are under appeal and therefore subject to 
being overruled) ana many recent decisions holding that a certified 
union is a legal entity with power to sue and be sued.18 In the l .L .A  and 
Tunney  cases the court directed judgment against the union and held 
that the union’s funds could be levied on to satisfy the judgment. If 
these judgments stand, the same relief should be available to satisfy a 
monetary claim arising out of an arbitration award entered as a judgment, 
and it should not be carrying the analogy too far to apply sequestration 
against a union for failure to comply with a non-monetary order.
If the I .L .A .  and Tuntiey  cases are overruled on the point now dis­
cussed, employees seeking to obtain payment of monetary awards out of 
union funds must resort to the rules of law under wliich judgments 
against trustees may be satisfied out of trust funds held by tnem. This 
is only possible when union officers who are trustees of union funds can 
be made parties to the proceedings. This procedure is fraught with diffi­
culties which are purposely passed over in this paper.
2. Enforcement by Prosecution
Section 18 (3) of the Labour Relations Act provides tfhat every partv 
to and every person bound by a collective agreement, or on whose behalf 
it was enterea into, must comply with the provision for final settlement 
and give effect thereto. Under this section the parties to a labour 
arbitration are bound by statute to carry the award into effect. Section 
40 makes it an offence for a person to do anything prohibited by the 
Act or to refuse to do anything required by the Act, and provides pen­
<161 Carlin & Cusack v Galbraith et al-----Ja n u a ry . 1957 (unreported).
117* Tnnney v Orchard et al [19551 3 D.L.R. 15.
1 18 1 Ibid, per T ritsch ler, J . ,  a t p. 47 et seq H ollywood Theatre* v T nnney [19401 1 D .L.R  
452; Re Patterson b  Nanaim o, etc. [1947 ) 4 D .L.R . 1£9; Medalta Potteries v L om frld fe  
[1947 ] 2 W.W.R. 856; Peerless Laundry etc. L'nlonji 1952» 1 C .L .L .R . 15,041; Re Med- 
jacks Furnltare (19571 1 C .L .L .R . 16,062 (N .B .L .H .B .); in Christie W oodw orklnf v 
N ational Union of W oodworkers H956— unreporterf), B rid ges, J .  ordered  an  in ju n ct­
ion and declared  aga in st a certified  union itself. In a paper presented  at the C an ad ­
ian B a r  A ssociation  A n nual M eeting in 1955, R. V. H icks, Q.C. and  W. S . W hittaker 
of the O ntario B ar. concluded that unions could not $ue or be sued In Ontario. It is 
subm itted  th at the above authorities are  preponderant and that in the other Com ­
mon Law  provinces the statu s of a union to sue apd  be sued m ust be regarded  as 
settled.
alties for a breach.19 Thus, either independently of, or concurrently with, 
the enforcement procedures outlined above, the partv in whose favour 
the award is made may prosecute the offending party for a breach of the 
Labour Relations Act.
D am ages
If a breach of a collective agreement can now only be enforced bv 
arbitration and not by court action, the question would arise: “What 
about damages?” Although damages against the offending party are 
not generally regarded as nccessary or desirable in many labour relations 
disputes, there will certainly arise cases in which damages arc appropriate. 
For example, if an employee is discharged contrary to the terms of the 
wage agreement, he would have redress under the arbitration procedure 
required by the Act, but if the collective agreement does not specifically 
provide for ordering the offending employer to compensate the employee 
for lost wages due to an improper dismissal, surely the employee should 
not be without a remedy for damages. Conversely if an employee brea­
ches a collective agreement and damages result to the employer, the em­
ployer should have the right to recover damages from the offending em­
ployee, or if the union is at fault, from the union. The awarding of dam­
ages appears, therefore a void left by the taking away of court action.
The obvious solution, of course, is for the collective agreement it­
self to provide for payment of some damages, and to provide that the 
arbitration board may determine them. Labour practitioners should 
endeavour to see that collective agreements provide for this contingency. 
If the agreement provides for payment of lost wages to an employee 
improperly dismissed, no damages problem arises. The difficulty is the 
practical impossibility of providing in a collective agreement for all even­
tualities which might give rise to a proper claim for damages.
Another solution seems to be possible from the words of section 18 
providing for “ final settlement, .o f all differences” . If a difference arises 
in such circumstances that it is proper that the offending party should 
pay damages to the innocent party, it would appear that no settlement 
can be “ final” until the amount of such damages has been determined 
and awarded. For example, where an employee is improperly discharged 
and has lost several weeks wages before the arbitration board finds the 
dismissal was improper, the difference has not been finally settled as far 
as the employee is concerned until he is compensated for his lost wages. 
Thus, if the agreement is silent as to the award of damages by an arbi­
tration board, it would appear to be open to the aggrieved party to apply 
to the Labour Relations Board under subsection (2) for an order pres­
cribing a provision for “ final settlement” . The board would have power, 
under the subsection to prescribe a method for determining and award­
ing the damages properly due.
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(19) R .S .N .B . 1952, c. 124; s. 42, R .S .N .S . 1954, c. 295, is iden tical; for P .E .I. see s. 25(2) 
T rade  Union Act as enacted  by c. 3 of the statu tes of that province for 1953 (2nd
S ess .) .
38 U. N. B. LAW JOURNAL
It should be pointed out in passing that the damages awarded 
would only be those which a court could award for a breach of contract. 
No claim for exemplary or punitive damages could be entertained since 
those types of damages are peculiar to tort and alien to contract.
ENFORCEM ENT B Y  IMMEDIATE PROSECUTION
A few words should be said about immediate prosecution as a me­
thod of enforcing a collective agreement.
rITiere is no section in the New Brunswick Labour Relations Act 
making it an offence for any person to violate the terms of a collective 
agreement (other than section 18(3) referred to above). Direct prose­
cution, therefore, is impossible unless of course an unfair labour practice 
is involved. Prosecution as a method of enforcement can only be em- 
ploved to enforce an arbitration award as outlined above. It makes little 
difference, however, whether a prosecution is started immediately or 
after an arbitration because in most prosecutions the question would be 
raised whether the alleged offender had in fact violated the Labour 
Relations Act, and this dispute would have to be resolved by arbitration 
in any event.
The situation seems to be different in Nova Scotia. Section 18(2) 
of the Trade Unions Act of that province requires every person bound 
by a collective agreement to do everything he is required to do and re­
frain from doing anything he is required to refrain from doing by the 
provisions of the collective agreement. Penalties are provided, as in the 
New Brunswick Act, for a violation of the Act. For what it is worth, 
therefore, an immediate prosecution for a violation of a collective agree­
ment can be taken in Nova Scotia without resorting to arbitration, prov­
ided, of course, there is no difference or dispute as to whether the col­
lective agreement has been violated, which must, by statute, be referred 
to an arbitration board.
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